Chairman Tauzin

Prepared Witness Testimony

The House Committee on Energy and Commerce

W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman

Link to Committee Tip Line:  Fight Waste, Fraud and Abuse
   

 

 

Continuing Concerns Over Imported Pharmaceuticals

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
June 7, 2001
10:00 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building 

 

 
 

Mr. James Christian
Vice President and Head of Corporate Security
Novartis International AG
701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 725
Washington, D.C., 20004

My name is James Christian and I am Vice President and Head of Global Corporate Security for Novartis International AG.   Prior to joining Novartis, I was a Special Agent in Charge with the United States Secret Service where my responsibilities included suppression of counterfeiting of U.S. currency in Latin America. At Novartis, I oversee operations to protect the assets and reputation of Novartis in the 140 countries in which the company markets its products or in which the products or their raw ingredients are manufactured, packaged, stored, or shipped.  In this capacity, I have witnessed firsthand the considerable ingenuity and resourcefulness that unlawful enterprises in foreign countries utilize to manufacture and distribute ineffective and often unsafe counterfeit products.  There can be no question that foreign drug counterfeiters take full advantage of offshore mail-order pharmacies, the Internet, and visitors from other countries to market their goods.  Furthermore, if the United States permits the reimportation of drugs as provided in legislation enacted last year, the financial rewards for drug counterfeiters will ensure that they make every effort to penetrate deeply the U.S. marketplace causing considerable harm to the health and safety of U.S. citizens

I.                   BACKGROUND 

Novartis Group is a multinational research-based healthcare business headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, with U.S. headquarters in New Jersey.  We have more than 67,000 employees worldwide with over 15,000 in the United States. The company’s product line includes 126 prescription drugs to treat or prevent conditions as varied as rheumatoid arthritis, schiozophrenia, hypertension, Alzheimer’s disease, high cholesterol, migraine headaches, epilepsy, cancer, and organ rejection in kidney, liver, and heart transplants.  Several weeks ago the FDA approved our new orphan drug, Gleevec™, for chronic myeloid leukemia, which represents one of the most significant cancer treatment breakthroughs in many years.

Novartis has a compelling interest in protecting the assets represented by the drugs that it currently has in the market as well as those now under development.  In this year alone, Novartis will spend more than $2.4 billion on drug research and development.  More importantly, it is critical that patients using Novartis products have every confidence that the drugs are safe and effective.  For these reasons, Novartis dedicates considerable manpower and financial resources to addressing drug counterfeiting on a global scale. Accordingly, Novartis works closely with law enforcement and health authorities in numerous countries to investigate and suppress the counterfeiting of its products. 

II.                COUNTERFEITING 

Counterfeit drugs are “fake” drugs, produced and packaged to look like the genuine article. Counterfeit drugs may include products containing correct ingredients, incorrect ingredients, no active ingredient, an insufficient quantity of active ingredient, or withand have phony packaging and labeling.  Illicit operations may combine counterfeit product with adulterated or expired product, or on occasion, with some genuine product to make detection more difficult.  Counterfeiters employstate-of-the-art technologies such as desktop publishing to produce counterfeit labelsthat are indistinguishable from the true original labels.  These labels put false “new” expiration dates on expired products and make adulterated or ineffective drugs look like the real thing.  Counterfeiters have the ability to make and stamp tablets with company logos and even to package them in blister packs.

While we have scores of examples of such activities, there are some that demonstrate the deceit and danger inherent in drug counterfeiting:

(1)    A raid on a counterfeiter’s facility uncovered tens of thousands of vials of a drug whose expiration date had long-since passed.  The vials were soaked in hot water to remove the old labels, and counterfeit labels bearing a new expiration date were affixed.  In similar circumstances, drugs in vials and ampules have lost their efficacy because their temperatures were raised to unacceptable levels during the label-removing process. 

(2)    Our efforts also interdicted millions of yellow tablets that were virtually indistinguishable from the genuine product – including the company logo.  These tablets were made of boric acid, floor wax, and lead-based yellow paint used for road markings.  Sacks of these “raw materials” were stacked throughout the counterfeiter’s site. 

Counterfeiting is prevalent outside the United States and is growing at an alarming pace.  A joint workshop of the World Health Organization and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations concluded in 1992 that in some countries as much as 60 percent of all drugs may be counterfeit.  Since then, every major pharmaceutical company has seen an increase in the volume of counterfeit medicines.  Over the last fiveyears, Novartis has assisted or otherwise been involved in over 100 investigations of counterfeiting operations, in over 33 countries, involving more than 11 Novartis products and more than 200 products manufactured by other companies.

A survey of the international media demonstratesthat the problem of counterfeit, substandard, contaminated, and poisoned drugs is worldwide — fake Xenical in Hong Kong, phony ampicillin and AZT in Vietnam, counterfeit Mefloquine in Cambodia. Recentlyin the United States, counterfeit fertility drugshave been found in New York and phony Propecia and Viagra  discoveredin Boston. Counterfeiting and diversion are particularly prevalent and dangerous in Latin America and Asia.

Mexico and Central America. Counterfeit products area major concernin Mexico, Central America, and the Dominican Republic.  Counterfeiting in Mexico is particularly dangerous for American consumers because of the shared border between Mexico and the United States.  U.S. consumers traveling over the border to Mexico to buy products off pharmacy shelves may purchase dangerous counterfeit or adulterated products.  A recent article in the New York Timesreportedthata chemical analysis had found several sampled Mexican drugs to be counterfeit- including an anti-depressant, an ulcer treatment, and a diabetes medication. American law enforcement officials opined that the amount of counterfeit and substandard medications in Mexico could be as high as 25 percent.  Based on our knowledge, the problem could be much larger.  Moreover, in my experience, U.S. Customs and FDA lack the resources and infrastructure to police the border adequately to prevent criminal smuggling of bulk counterfeits from Mexico to the U.S. 

Argentina.  From May 1999 until June 2000, Novartis worked with authorities in Argentina to combat the counterfeiting of four Novartis products - Voltaren (an anti-inflammatory), Tegretol (an anti-epileptic), Hydergine (dementia), and Reliveran (arthritis).  As a result of that investigation, 72 individuals were arrested, 7 tons of counterfeit pharmaceuticals were seized, 49 different counterfeit pharmaceuticals were identified, 13 clandestine labs were dismantled, and 5 print shops were seized. 

Brazil.  In early 1999, it became apparent to the pharmaceutical industry that there was a major counterfeit pharmaceutical problem in Brazil.  At that time, 132 counterfeit products - from most major companies - were identified as being distributed in Brazil. The Pharmaceutical Security Institute (an industry organization formed to support anti-counterfeiting efforts) working with the Brazilian Minister of Health trained a team of 25 investigators to attack the counterfeit medicine problem. Approximately 20 clandestine labs were seized and numerous arrests were made.

Colombia. Counterfeit drugs are manufactured in Colombia for international distribution.  In 2000 alone, more than 400 products from 80 companies, either expired, adulterated, diverted or counterfeit, were seized by INVIMA (the Colombian food and drug authority) working with Novartis and other multinational pharmaceutical companies. Investigations, raids, and seizures are continuing with extraordinary results.  So far, approximately 6 million ampules of counterfeit Voltaren have been seized.  Tens of millions of counterfeit tablets of another pharmaceutical company's non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug have been seized. Dr. Miguel Rueda, Director of INVIMA, believes that the counterfeit, expired, and altered drugs were to be distributed not only in Colombia but also in Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Central America. While INVIMA is working hard to combat the problem in Colombia, the necessary resources are not always available.

Asia.  The counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals is a burgeoningproblem in China.  For example, in March 2001, Novartis and other pharmaceutical companies participated in a raid with authorities in Shantou that resulted in the seizure of over 1800 cartons of counterfeit pharmaceutical products from 14 multinational companies. 

India.   Another threat to U.S. consumers relates to the distribution of bulk pharmaceutical products from India.  India refusesto recognize intellectual property rights and as a result, through process patents, Indian companies manufacture and ship patent-protected bulk pharmaceutical products around the world. Technically, the Indian products should only be shipped to countries that recognize process patents, but in fact much of this bulk product shows up in countries that recognize product patents.   In fact, there is reason to believe that some of this material is shipped to the United States for manufacturing and packaging, and then exported to other places such as Mexico.  Often the product ends up back in the United States when American citizens go to Mexico to purchase pharmaceuticals.  Health authorities in a number of Latin American countries believe that India and Cuba use the region as a dumping ground for batches of pharmaceuticals that are substandard. For example, health authorities have discovered products without sufficient active ingredient and contaminated with foreign materials including pieces of glass.   Those products can be sold to U.S. consumers in Mexico or may be smuggled into the U.S. and placed on U.S. pharmacy shelves.

III.             LACK OF CONTROL OF COUNTERFEITING 

Novartis, like other drug companies, and, unfortunately, law enforcement authorities are hampered in ourtheeffort to control international counterfeiting practices by  severalfactors including: (1) the difficulty of detecting counterfeits; (2) the lack of dedicated resources in local jurisdictions and the failure to give appropriate priority toanti-counterfeiting activity; (3)the ingenuity of counterfeiters and the ease with which criminal elements can resume operations at new sites; and (4) the lack of applicable criminal statutes and the prevalence traditionally light sentences.

Inability to detect.  Many counterfeit pharmaceuticals are manufactured so cleverly that it is virtually impossible for consumers, government officials, and law enforcement agencies to identify them as counterfeit. Counterfeiters do not care about the quality and safety of the product. They concentrate theirresources on the appearance of the product and its packaging.  The goal is to sell a cheap, fake product to an unsuspecting consumer, not to provide a safe and effective medicine to a patient.It can be virtually impossible for consumers to tell the difference between a counterfeit and a genuine product. Even pharmacists, doctors, and government regulators can be fooled. Field tests can determine whether the active ingredient is present, but not whether the active ingredient is present in the appropriate amount, whether there are any impurities or foreign substances in the product, or whether the product is expired.

The ability to detect counterfeit products is made more difficult by  the practice of combining counterfeit product, adulterated product, expired product, and genuine product. Distributors supply the resulting intermingled combination to physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, and health agencies.  Such shipment might be 50 percent "bad."  If a test is performed on a genuine pill from the intermingled shipment, the counterfeit shipment passes undetected.

Lack of enforcement.   Many countries fail to enforce their counterfeiting laws vigorously.  Local jurisdictions frequently lack the resources and technological sophistication needed to address the problem. Some countries spend their resources on other national priorities and not anti-counterfeiting activities. In other. countries, criminal operations have infiltrated the law enforcement and regulatory community, precluding effective enforcement of the law. 

Professional criminal element.  Drug counterfeiters may be extremely large, sophisticated and well financed operations or, at the other extreme, they may be small opportunistic enterprises.  In Mexico, for example, it is believed that most, if not all, of the pharmacies located along the border, are owned and operated by Mexican organized crime groups. In Latin America, crime syndicates bring together manufacturing and printing skills and often link them with existing pharmaceutical distributors. By the time a counterfeiting operation is identified by a pharmaceutical company, it has generally been in operation for some time.  The subsequent investigation to develop facts, identify suspects, and determine the locations of clandestine labs and print shops can take years. During that time counterfeit drugs continue to be produced. Oftentimes the company's investigation must be fully developed before the local government will take any official interest in the problem. Clandestine labs are usually crude and can be easily shut down and reopened elsewhere by counterfeiters who suspect that they or the location have been compromised.  In my experience, the professional criminals who engage in counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals are able to elude arrest and prosecution by shifting their operations from location to location and by taking advantage of delays in the investigation process.

IV.              THE THREAT TO U.S. CONSUMERS 

There is ample opportunity for counterfeit products to enter the United States across the Mexican border. A recent survey by the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs at the border between Tijuana and San Diego revealed that a sample group of 200 travelers returned to the United States with 28,409 dosage units. Assuming that 25 percent of Mexican pharmaceuticals are counterfeit or adulterated, those 200 patients alone may have brought 7000 counterfeit or adulterated doses into the United States. 

Counterfeit products present a severe safety risk to consumers.  Counterfeit products are deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to their identity and their source. They might be manufactured in garages, basements, and warehouses.  The manufacturers do not adhere to good manufacturing practices.  There is no guarantee the products were manufactured in a sterile environment, and no information about how the products were packaged, stored, handled, or shipped.  Active ingredients, when present, are often in an incorrect amount.  Often there is no active ingredient at all, or a completely different ingredient.  If the medication is intended for a serious condition, an unexpected change in the dosage, the substitution of an illegal ingredient, or the lack of an active ingredient could well be life threatening.  If the medication is intended for a serious and chronic condition, a month's supply of counterfeit drugs could place the consumer's long-term health in jeopardy.

Additional problems arise with expired and adulterated medicines.   Parallel trade and diversion of medicines often results in labels being changed so that they are in the local language.  There are instances where the products lose efficacy during the label change process. Labels are often added to outdated products, giving the appearance that the shelf life is much longer.

V.        CONCLUSION

In 1987, the House Energy and Commerce Committee concluded that permitting re-importation of American drugs "prevents effective control or even routine knowledge of the true sources of merchandise in a significant number of cases."  As a result, "pharmaceuticals which have been mislabeled, misbranded, improperly stored or shipped, have exceeded their expiration dates, or are bald counterfeits, are injected into the national distribution system for ultimate sale to consumers." Indeed, "the very existence of the market for reimported goods provides the perfect cover for foreign counterfeits." Since 1986, criminal counterfeiting operations have become more numerous, more sophisticated, and more aggressive.  The resulting danger to U.S. consumers is greater than ever before.  Now is not the time to weaken the ability of the United States to prevent counterfeit drugs from reaching U.S. citizens. If reimportation of prescription drugs resumes, Congress will soon be holding hearings to determine how to stop the flow of dangerous counterfeit medicines into the United States.

 
 

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