Chairman Tauzin

Prepared Witness Testimony

The House Committee on Energy and Commerce

W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman

Link to Committee Tip Line:  Fight Waste, Fraud and Abuse
   

 

 

Three Bills Pertaining to the Transport of Solid Waste: H.R. 382, H.R. 411 and H.R. 1730

Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials
July 23, 2003
3:00 PM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building 

 

 
 

Mr. Daniel Esty
Yale Law School
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT, 06520

Good afternoon. I am Dan Esty, Director of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. In a former life at the Environmental Protection Agency in Washington, I was a Special Assistant to Administrator William Reilly (1989-90), Deputy Chief of Staff (1990-91), and then Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy (1991-1993), and I served as one of the negotiators of the environmental provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). I would like to thank the Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to offer my views on the important waste trade issues that are before the Congress.

The legislation before this Subcommittee raises critical questions about the relation of environmental protection to trade obligations. In brief, I see the challenge centering on the question of how best to structure a set of environmental safeguards without running afoul of these obligations? The three bills before you - H.R. 382, H.R. 411, and H.R. 1730 - represent different approaches to regulating the inter-state and international movement of municipal solid waste. The bills' authors share a common goal, which is to protect the environment. So the question I want to address is: which approach is most likely to achieve this outcome?

Before answering this question, I would like to speak briefly about the framework of trade agreements and obligations that shape the context for this analysis. Regardless of one's views of NAFTA, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), or the US-Canada Waste Trade Agreement, these agreements represent binding obligations on the United States. To ignore these obligations invites legal and political challenges to any structure of environmental controls that a state might choose to adopt. Dispute resolution processes within the international trading system often take years to be resolved, which could create chaos and postpone the implementation of an appropriate structure of environmental controls on waste shipments. As I will explain below, the best way to ensure that the states have the ability to regulate waste shipments and to limit the environmental harm that unrestricted waste disposal might inflict, is carefully constructed regulation that minimizes the risk of NAFTA or GATT challenges.

I should also add at this preliminary juncture a word about our own Supreme Court's scrutiny of restrictions on interstate waste shipments. In past cases such as Philadelphia v. New Jersey (437 U.S. 617 (1978)) and Ft. Gratiot v. Michigan (504 U.S. 353 (1992)), the Supreme Court has struck down attempts by states to regulate interstate movement of solid municipal waste. These cases can, however, be differentiated from the legislation at hand. Both H.R. 382 and H.R. 1730 explicitly confer upon the states immunity from the strictures of the Commerce Clause.

The ability of Congress to authorize state regulation, even to the extent of burdening interstate commerce appears to be quite clearly settled as a matter of law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that Congress can immunize state regulation, including environmental standards, even where the regulatory approach affects interstate trade that might otherwise be protected by the dormant Commerce Clause. In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (472 U.S. 159 (1985)), the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Reserve Board's approval of applications by out-of-state companies for acquisition of bank holding companies in Massachusetts and Connecticut partly on the basis that Congress had immunized the relevant state statutes: "When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause." As recently as this past June, the Supreme Court emphasized in Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons (123 S. Ct. 2142 (2003)) that, though in the case at hand there was no immunity from the Commerce Clause, "Congress certainly has the power to authorize state regulations that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce." But the Court "will not assume that it has done so unless such an intent is clearly expressed." Thus, the bills under discussion today would likely withstand Commerce Clause review.

The real issue with this legislation does not concern interstate trade and the dormant Commerce Clause, but rather international trade and the obligations imposed on United States (and by extension to each of the 50 states) under various agreements to which the United States is a party. In this regard, import bans are likely to run afoul of US trade obligation. Both Article XI of the GATT and Article 309:1 of NAFTA prohibit a member country from imposing quantitative restrictions on goods imported from other member countries. And both agreements forbid discriminatory behavior

Yet both NAFTA and the GATT provide exemptions for legitimate environmental policies that are carefully constructed, even those that might have a disruptive effect on trade. Properly designed legislation could therefore afford effective environmental protection and meet our international trade obligations -thereby minimizing the possibility of a dispute with the chaos and delay that would be entailed.

Two elements of Article XX of the GATT provide a foundation for appropriate state regulation of waste shipments. Article XX(b) allows for environmental measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health," as long as they are "not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." A French ban on imports of asbestos under this exception was recently upheld by the Appellate Body of the WTO.

Article XX(g) provides an even clearer foundation for carefully crafted restrictions on waste shipments. It states that the GATT shall not prevent contracting parties from taking actions "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." GATT panels have interpreted this language to mean that a questioned environmental policy should be "primarily aimed" at addressing a conservation goal and invoked in conjunction with comparable domestic restraints.

The NAFTA contains similar language. The basic prohibition on quantitative trade restrictions and the national treatment obligation are subject to exemptions for legitimate environmental policies. US-Canada trade relations are further framed by the 1986 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, which was amended in 1992 to include municipal solid waste. The terms of this Agreement are especially important to address because, by the terms of the NAFTA, it prevails over the NAFTA should there be an inconsistency between them.

H.R. 411 expressly recognizes the US obligations under the US-Canada Waste Trade Agreement and seeks to strengthen the environmental safeguards built into this agreement. H.R. 411 would use the existing US-Canada framework to ramp up the oversight of the flow of waste from Canada to the United States, requiring, for example, the EPA to implement and enforce the established notification and consent procedures. Of the three bills presently under consideration by the Subcommittee, H.R. 411 represents the one that is least likely to be challenged as a violation of US trade obligations. In this regard, it represents the best bet for promoting quick environmental action to address the waste trade problem.

H.R. 382 seems to be at the greatest risk of engendering a challenge based on international trade obligations. Because it authorizes virtually any regime of waste regulation that a state might choose to adopt, including a ban on waste imports, it would likely be seen as a threat to the free trade principles of the GATT and the NAFTA and a potential direct violation of the US-Canada Waste Agreement. H.R. 382 has a simple elegance. But in a complex world, simple solutions rarely work. I believe that H.R. 382 would almost certainly draw multiple legal challenges.

Since H.R. 382 simply authorizes state restrictions on waste trade and does not mandate them, it might not trigger a GATT or NAFTA challenge immediately. Under the emerging jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization, laws that permit outcomes that might be inconsistent with a country's trade obligations will generally not be considered ripe for challenge. But a law that creates "explicit risks" of a breach of WTO obligations might be considered a sufficient basis to launch a GATT challenge and for Canada to request that a dispute settlement panel be seated. The sweeping nature of what might be done under the authorization of H.R. 382 makes this a risky approach to regulating waste shipments.

Because H.R. 1730 is more narrowly tailored, it is much less likely to precipitate a challenge based on US trade obligations. Unlike H.R. 382, H.R. 1730 is not open-ended. It specifies a particular set of regulations that states may adopt rather than giving states "carte blanche" authorization to restrict foreign waste trade. In addition, H.R. 1730 tracks more carefully the language and disciplines of GATT Article XX(g). It makes a state's authority to regulate waste shipments contingent on the state's own efforts to promote recycling and places any effort to limit foreign municipal solid waste imports within the broader context of U.S. attempts to reduce the nation's own municipal solid waste.

Environmental protection represents an important public policy goal. But regulation must be done on a pragmatic basis that promises to deliver real, on-the-ground progress. Efforts to control waste shipments must therefore be undertaken with an eye on other policy goals and constraints. Developing a system of waste trade restrictions that ignores international trade obligations makes no sense and invites trouble. Systematically designed legislation that carefully defines what states can do and seeks to promote consistency with the GATT, NAFTA, and other international trade obligations of the United States offers the best path forward.

Thank you.

 
 

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